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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
CARTER PHILLIPS*
Thank you, Dean, I appreciate that introduction very much. First of
all, let me thank the Law Review for inviting me here. It's a wonderful
opportunity. Some of you already know this; I'm now snowed "out" of
D.C. It turns out I can't get back to Washington, so I'm going to have to
"suffer the difficulties" of staying in Miami for another day. I think I'll
get over that. My wife may have a different take on how lovely this was,
but I'm pretty happy about it.
You know, when I was told the topic is "What change will come in
administrative law?", I thought that I would do what my son did a few
years back. He and former Solicitor General Rex Lee were very close
friends. Rex was at a brunch with our family, and he was getting ready
to go to a PBS program where he was going to talk about the upcoming
Supreme Court term. Ryan was about six years old at the time, and the
idea of somebody on television excited him greatly. He said, "Well, take
me with you! I want to go on TV and be with you!" And Rex said,
"Well, Ryan I'm going to go on TV and I'm going to talk about the
Supreme Court. I mean, what would you want to say in that circum-
stance?" And Ryan said, "Well, I'd tell them I'm not talking about that
stuff! I'm talking about Star Wars!"
So, I am not talking about that stuff. I am going to talk a little bit
about a couple of institutions, and I am going to try to be at least tangen-
tially relevant to the administrative law theme, today, but probably only
tangentially relevant. And what I would like to talk about is, roughly, the
* Mr. Phillips is the Managing Partner of the Washington, D.C. office of Sidley Austin
LLP. He served as a law clerk to both Judge Robert Sprecher of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and Chief Justice Warren E. Burger of the United States Supreme Court. Mr.
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role and significance of two institutions in the development of any
change in administrative law that is to come. The two I have in mind-
this will come as no surprise since you've heard my introduction-are
the Solicitor General, and his or her role in how any change would play
out, and then the Supreme Court, and what is likely to happen to admin-
istrative law in that forum. And I realize, on the Supreme Court side,
that I am going to step on somebody's toes because somebody else
either has talked about or plans to talk about the Fox Television case. I
have to confess, however, that case is very near and dear to my heart
since I argued it in the Second Circuit, in the Supreme Court, and two
weeks ago re-argued the case when it went back to the Second Circuit.
So, I cannot resist the temptation to talk about it, although I will proba-
bly resist the temptation to use expletives here-a temptation that I did
not resist in either of my arguments in the Second Circuit. (If you want
to see them, you can get both broadcasts on the web. CSPAN has it, so if
you want to see expletives being used in a federal court of appeals,
they're there for you to take in. I do not recommend it as a matter of
course if you're an appellate advocate; but in this very narrow circum-
stance, it seemed appropriate and it worked.)
Part of the reason that I can make comments about the Solicitor
General's role with a fair amount of confidence has already been
explained by the dean. I did start my Supreme Court practice in the
Solicitor General's office with the Carter administration. His Solicitor
General was Judge Wade McCree, a wonderful, wonderful judge who
has since passed away, and then I stayed on through the transition when
Rex Lee became the Solicitor General in the Reagan administration. It
was fascinating to watch that change. What was particularly interesting
was how the Solicitor General's office handled that transition, and I
assume the same approach will be taken in this administration because
the institutional memory of the office is powerful and will ensure that
things will not change. During the change-over, a situation that arose,
not uncommonly, was that cases would come before the office involving
regulations or other orders adopted by the Carter administration that
were viewed by the business community as "insufferable." That's proba-
bly the best word you could use for it. I will not use the expletives used
by the business advocates who came to the Solicitor General's office. A
lot of those rules and regulations were upheld by the courts of appeals,
mostly by the D.C. Circuit, but some of them were upheld in other
courts as well. And so, the business community then would seek certio-
rari review by the Supreme Court of the D.C. Circuit or other courts of
appeals' rulings. Their advocates would appear in the Solicitor General's
office saying, "Look, you argued in defense of this rule in the D.C. Cir-
cuit. That was the Carter administration. This is the Reagan administra-
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tion. We supported your election and, therefore, we believe that you
should support our position at this point. So you should confess error, or
otherwise allow the Supreme Court to grant our petitions for certiorari,
so that we can have an opportunity to eliminate all of those rules. And
this will be clean, and swift, and easy."
Now, the position that Rex took, and I admire him greatly for it,
was: That's not what we're in the business of doing-that when the
United States government takes a position in one court, it does not gen-
erally take the opposite position in another court simply because the
person in the Office of the Presidency has changed. He believed that
doing so would send an extraordinarily bad message and certainly
offend his notion that the Solicitor General is the tenth justice, who is
there to promote justice in front of the United States Supreme Court.
I can personally remember a number of instances in which this
view of the Solicitor General's role won out. Erwin Griswold was
involved in one instance that I remember most vividly. He was, himself,
a former Solicitor General representing the chemical industry. I remem-
ber him coming in and making an impassioned plea about how you-the
Solicitor General's office-have to change position. He was relying on
the Chenery Doctrine, which states that the courts cannot uphold deci-
sions by agencies on grounds that were not adopted by those agencies.
He said, "On that basis, the rule has to be thrown out. The D.C. Circuit's
gone off the deep end." And, I said to him, "Well, you know, there is
another Supreme Court decision out of the National Labor Relations
Board that says that the doctrine was never meant to turn this process
into a ping-pong tournament." He turned as bright red as anyone I had
ever seen. But, significantly, when the time came for the Solicitor Gen-
eral to decide on the right thing to do, he refused to confess error. Rex
Lee refused to shift position.
In fact, we consistently opposed Supreme Court review in those
cases. There must have been at least a dozen such cases over the time
that I served in the Solicitor General's office, and Supreme Court rou-
tinely denied those petitions for certiorari. So to the extent people
believe that when administrations change, you are going to see a huge
litigation shift as a consequence, let me suggest to you that this is not
likely to happen. And I do not think the current Solicitor General is
going to be any more responsive to the entreaties of, for example, envi-
ronmentalists or other groups who are this President's constituents, than
Rex was to the business community. That is one half of the equation for
the change in administrative law that is or, more accurately, is not to
come.
The second half of the equation is another case that, like the Fox
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Television case, is near and dear to my heart. Again, I will tell you
where I stand so that you will recognize that I am not speaking here as a
dispassionate person. I am an advocate. I have a case before the
Supreme Court right now called American Chemistry Council v. The
Sierra Club. This is a case that is a slight variant of the one I described
to you earlier. This case emerges from a decision of the Environmental
Protection Agency, in 1994, to enact an exemption from some very
onerous environmental restrictions in the Clean Air Act. The exemption
applied in situations where a plant was either starting up or shutting
down or was experiencing a malfunction. In those circumstances, if the
EPA had imposed the most rigorous environmental restrictions, frankly,
the affected plant would always have been in violation of the statute.
And, since the Clean Air Act carries criminal penalties, this was a matter
of some importance to the business community. That 1994 exemption
ruling had a fair number of bells and whistles that went with it which,
roughly speaking, made the exemption less helpful to the business com-
munity. I will try to keep this discussion at a high level of generality
because you do not want to learn EPA rules in this particular setting.
Basically, what happened is that in 2006, the previous administration's
EPA decided to eliminate all of the exemption's bells and whistles. As a
result, the Sierra Club went to the D.C. Circuit to challenge the EPA's
decision to eliminate the bells and whistles; but it also wanted to chal-
lenge the underlying rule that granted the exemption in the first place as
inconsistent with the governing statute, the Clean Air Act. Interestingly,
that Act provides that if you want to challenge a rule issued by the EPA,
you must do so within sixty days. If you fail to challenge the rule in that
period of time, your challenge is supposed to be barred. The statute is as
plain as I just described it. Despite my earlier disclosure, I do not think
I'm being an advocate when I say this. I think that is the best reading of
the statutory scheme. Well, the D.C. Circuit, obviously not completely
comfortable with that rigidity, decided some years ago that despite the
statute's plain language, there would be what the court called a "con-
structive re-opener." That is, if the agency sufficiently alters a regula-
tion, members of the public get another sixty days to challenge the rule.
Now, I would question whether the bells and whistles on the regulation I
am discussing were significant enough so that, based on their elimina-
tion, the parties involved would have a different stake in the regulation
that would justify allowing them to go to court and reopen the regulation
to legal challenges. I have to say that a small part of me eagerly antici-
pates hearing the federal government defend this approach in front of
Justice Scalia, for instance. He is somebody who might have some dif-
ferent, and might I say, strongly held and expressed views about how
plain language should be read and thus how all of this ought to play out.
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In any event, this case went to the D.C. Circuit, the D.C. Circuit
used this particular "constructive re-opener" standard. It allowed the
challenge to the 1994 rule, and struck down the rule on the ground that it
exceeded the EPA's authority under the statue. My firm filed a petition
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on behalf of the cheni-
cal industry.
The question then, is what does the Solicitor General do in that
situation? Obviously, the Solicitor General and this administration are
not all that fond of the rule, and would be perfectly happy to have it
knocked out. On the other hand, from their perspective, as an institu-
tional matter, it is not necessarily the best thing in the world to be faced
with a legal rule that says, "If you play with one aspect of a regulation
that may reopen another aspect of that same regulation." In fact, there
may be a lot of existing rules that this administration strongly supports
and would prefer that polluters remain unable to challenge because the
sixty-day period has run. So, the D.C. Circuit's new legal rule is a two-
edged sword; it is like a lot of procedural rule. Sometimes they help you
and you love them, and sometimes you hate them.
In this situation, we went to the Solicitor General and said to her,
"This is a much more serious issue with repercussions well beyond this
case. First of all, you should have filed a petition for certiorari yourself,"
which she did not do. Second, we said, "If you do not do that, you
should at least support the petition that we're going to file." Now the
reason that this is at the very top of my mind at the moment is that I got
the brief by the Solicitor General yesterday, read it on the flight down
here, and it is fascinating. Basically, Solicitor General Kagan says, "The
D.C. Circuit is dead wrong; this is not the way they are supposed to
interpret statutory language, but the Court should not take the case
because the issue is not that big a deal. We can live with it because this
kind of re-opener does not come up all that often, we can litigate, etc."
Not surprisingly, the environmental groups and their opposition took a
slightly different tact, which was that this reopener process is the great-
est thing since sliced bread, and the courts should love it." It will be very
interesting to see what the Supreme Court does with this particular issue.
As I say, I can certainly imagine that Justice Scalia will take a dim view
of the reopener doctrine and its consequences for finality. On the other
hand, about eighty-five to ninety percent of the time, the Solicitor Gen-
eral gets the result she wants in submissions to the Supreme Court. So, I
am not standing here saying, optimistically, "I think the Court will take
the case." I will say, optimistically, that if they do grant certiorari in that
case, then I would be pretty hopeful as to its outcome.
Now, I am going to do a bit of a detour, here, because the other
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point that the Solicitor General made in opposing our petition for certio-
rari was that there is no split in the circuits on the question presented.
Those of you who are not Supreme Court advocates or Supreme Court
followers would not necessarily know that the Supreme Court has an
extraordinary obsession with conflicts in the Circuits as the sine que non
for granting certiorari . Again, I am an advocate, and I make a living by
getting cases to the Supreme Court, so this rule hits me where it hurts.
But, what I want to emphasize here is that the rationale for the rule
seems, to me, to have lost a lot of its currency today. And this is a point
that I have been wanting to make in a variety of settings, so I am going
to make it here because I have never had a chance to say it before.
There are two rationales for the Court's approach. The first is that
the Supreme Court has a lot of respect for lower court decisions and
wants to give the lower courts an opportunity to evaluate a particular
problem and provide the Supreme Court with insights on both sides of
an issue. Therefore, the Court waits until the issue has percolated. At
that point, a petition can bring the issue to the Court's attention and the
Court rill grant certiorari. The problem with that is that at almost no
other time in its history has the Supreme Court been less inclined gener-
ally to defer to the views of lower courts. They are not discomfited by
deciding that a rule that has been adopted by twelve Courts of Appeals is
wrong. I will concede for purposes of argument that the current Supreme
Court may be the smartest group we have seen on the Court in many
years, but it is at least inefficient for the Court and advocates to have to
wait to hear from Courts of Appeals before bringing issues to the
Supreme Court when the Court itself is so little inclined to defer to the
views of the lower courts. Indeed, it is with some caution that I make
reference to a Court of Appeals decision, concerned that the Court will
say, "That's not one of our decisions, is it?" Advocates only make that
mistake once. My point is simply that in this age of limited deference to
courts of appeals, the need for percolation does not work all that well as
a basis for delay in the Supreme Court's resolution of important and
difficult issues.
The second rationale for insisting on conflicts among the Circuits is
that, absent percolation, the Court might not hear both sides of an issue
effectively presented to it. This argument made much more sense twenty
or so years ago. Prior to the mid 1980s, the notion of a specialized
Supreme Court bar did not exist. At that time, it was much more com-
mon than not, approaching almost ninety percent of the time, that who-
ever was arguing in front of the Court would be making his or her first
and only argument Supreme Court argument. In addition, in those days,
it was much less common for amicus curiae to file briefs in support for
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one side or the other. And so, it seems to me, in that context, the Court
would legitimately be very concerned about whether it was going to see
all the sides of whatever issue it was deciding. Under those circum-
stances, it made sense for the Court to insist that the Courts of Appeals
had become entrenched in some kind of well developed conflict before
weighing in.
The problem with that rationale today is that we now have a spe-
cialized bar, and there exists a highly specialized amicus machine that
cranks out briefs in virtually every case that reaches the Court. The
notion that the Court is not going to get every conceivable angle on any
case is quite improbable. And, under those circumstances, it seems to
me, the Court ought to modify its standards for granting review, and
worry less about whether there is a conflict in the Circuits and somewhat
more about whether or not the case presents an important issue where
the Nation would be better served by having an answer provided sooner
rather than later.
Now, the consequence of accepting that analysis is that the Court's
docket would probably go from about 75 cases per term to 115 cases. I,
and others in our practice, would, of course, benefit from that
immensely, and that would be a very positive development, in my view.
I know that I have a personal stake in the outcome of this particular
issue, but I also believe that there are many cases and situations in which
the judicial system and the Nation would benefit from greater certainty
sooner.
The case I was describing above involving the "constructive
reopener" rule seems to be a perfect example of the kind of case where
the Court should recognize that it does not really need a split in the
Circuits to know that it should resolve the issue. Indeed, it is unlikely
that the Court will ever be confronted with a split in the Circuits because
these kinds of administrative law cases almost invariably go through the
D.C. Circuit. That means that either I or some other advocate will have
to wait until somebody can get the issue raised and decided in some
other Circuit. I will probably be long gone and retired before that hap-
pens. So, it would be interesting to see how the Court rules on the peti-
tion. I do not think I said it exactly this way in my reply brief, but I will
suggest to you, as I did to the Court, that this petition presents an issue
of overarching significance that does not need a conflict in the circuits to
justify its resolution by the Supreme Court.
Now, that brings me to the Fox Television case, which presents a
fascinating situation, and not just because it involves an interesting sub-
ject matter. Most of you have probably heard a little bit about it, so I will
give you only a thumbnail sketch. Fox Television was one victim of the
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indecency regime that the Federal Communications Commission
adopted. Indecency became a major issue back during the term before I
clerked at the Supreme Court, the 1977 term, in a case called FCC v.
Pacifica. There, George Carlin, a comedian, performed a routine called
the "Seven Dirty Words," which was broadcast on radio in the middle of
the day. Some horrified young child and his father complained bitterly,
and the case made it all the way up to the Supreme Court. Interestingly
enough, Justice Stevens wrote the opinion, not for the majority, for a
plurality as it turns out, in which they barely uphold the FCC's punish-
ment of the radio station against the First Amendment challenge. There
is a separate concurring opinion by Justices Powell and Blackmun which
says, "Look, it is one thing when you have this kind of shock treatment
or exposure through the public airways, we agree that can be regulated.
But, that is not to suggest that mere fleeting use of expletives would, in
any way, pass constitutional muster."
Surprisingly, the industry took that reasoning to heart, or maybe not
surprisingly, and it continued to operate under a regime in which it did
not use shocking expletives generally, but was perfectly content if occa-
sional expletives would sneak out during its programming. And if you
look at the next twenty-five years, there are instances, usually on radio
not on television, in which expletives made their way onto the airways;
and the FCC, taking what it called a "restrained approach," tended not to
do anything about those events.
Unfortunately, you arrive in the modern day and get the situation
where Bono gets up on national television and expresses his enthusiasm
for winning an award using the f-word. (Again, if people want the real
word, let me know, but I will use euphemisms for these purposes.) And
then, of course, Cher was soon to follow. She took the podium during
televised national music awards, and suggests that those who have criti-
cized her over the years, well, f- them. At that point, the FCC gets agi-
tated. And, then, Nicole Ritchie comes to the same television show the
next year and talks about trying to get cow manure out of a Prada bag,
except using the more explicit language, and talking about how difficult
that can be. You will recognize that this is, of course, why I went the law
school: to defend these First Amendment rights.
Now, the FCC's view of the world became particularly intense
when Janet Jackson's famous "wardrobe malfunction" occurred. At that
point, of course, the sky was the limit; there was a dramatic, sustained
over-reaction. There were massive numbers of complaints filed with the
FCC. There are groups that, apparently, do nothing but watch television.
Members of these groups apparently hear an indecent word on televi-
sion, and then send blast emails to the FCC objecting to the use of a
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particular word. The FCC then sends out a letter of inquiry, and the
television station has to look at the tape, and figure out whether some-
body said anything objectionable. About ninety-five percent of the time,
those complaining have simply misunderstood what word was
broadcast.
In any event, after the broadcasts described above, the FCC came
after Fox and issued an order saying that the use of the language by
Nicole Ritchie and Cher violated the Indecency Laws. Fox challenged
that determination and the issue went to the Second Circuit. It was an
interesting debate-whether to go to the D.C. Circuit or the Second Cir-
cuit. In fact, in the first go-round in the Second Circuit, Fox prevailed 2-
1. I know that at this point, you are all wondering what this has to do
with the topic, and I will get to it. But, first, the court's 2-1 decision
narrowly concluded that the FCC's change in its enforcement approach
(from tolerance to prosecution) was not adequately justified as a matter
of administrative procedure. And that holding was followed by a won-
derful eight pages of dicta, expressly labeled by the court as dicta. That
dicta explains that even if the FCC tried to explain its change in policy,
it would not be upheld because the policy itself violates the First
Amendment.
Judge Pierre Leval who is a genuine intellectual titan on the Second
Circuit, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he said, "I am not going to
deal with that constitutional analysis because that is dicta, but I have to
tell you, I think the agency justified its change in position adequately,
largely on the basis that it felt constrained by Pacifica for twenty-some-
thing years, but now it reads Pacifica differently and thinks it has a little
more discretion than it had. That is an adequate-not a great-reason
but good enough for 'government work."'
After reading the decision, I thought, "Well, this does not sound
like the kind of issue that the Supreme Court would be interested in.
Indeed, it is not the kind of issue that I would necessarily think a federal
agency or the Solicitor General would be inclined to take to the Supreme
Court." But, much to my chagrin, the Solicitor General, in fact, author-
ized the filing of a petition for certiorari. The FCC took the case up to
the Supreme Court on a very narrow issue, just the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act issue, specifically, whether or not the explanation was ade-
quate under the circumstances, expressly eschewing any discussion on
the First Amendment issue in the petition.
We, not surprisingly, opposed certiorari on the grounds that this
holding is pretty fact-specific: The question of when agencies can switch
course is a matter that has been well-developed in the case law. The
Supreme Court had decided the State Farm case some years ago and laid
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out the basic ground rules for that kind of switch in position by an
agency, and it did not really require more elucidation at this stage. And,
in any event, we explained, the Second Circuit sent the case back to the
Commission. The Commission thus could provide an adequate explana-
tion for its change in policy and then come back through the process,
and try to defend against the First Amendment challenge at that stage.
Much to my chagrin and disappointment, the Court granted the
Solicitor General's petition. Clearly there was no split in the circuits on
any particular issue in that case. I did ask the Solicitor General why he
had gone down this path because, normally, the Solicitor General is the
"filter" for cases involving the United States getting to the Supreme
Court. Any such case has to go through the Solicitor General. There are
a couple of exceptions to that rule that involve independent regulatory
agencies. The Federal Communications Commission does have some
independent litigating authority. The statute is unclear about it, but it
could be read to authorize the Commission to file a petition that the
Solicitor General has not joined. And so what the Solicitor General sug-
gested was, in that circumstance, he felt that his discretion was slightly
more constrained than it might be in a situation where it was exclusively
his choice whether or not to take a case to the Supreme Court.
The significance of this is obvious, or maybe not obvious, but
important. The case goes to the Supreme Court, and the Court hands
down its opinion. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, perhaps suggesting to
you that, probably, my position on indecency did not fare all that well at
the Court. And basically, he said two things which bear on the issue of
what change is coming in administrative law and how it will fare at the
Court. One, he said that the standard by which a court determines
whether an agency has provided an adequate explanation for changing
positions is extremely deferential and that courts do not and should not
expect much out of them by way of explanation. If the agency's expla-
nation is that it thought that Pacifica required them to take one position
then, and that it has concluded that it was wrong about Pacifica now,
that is an adequate explanation. Second, and I think probably more con-
troversially, he rejected the argument that where you are talking about
content-based regulation of speech protected by the First Amendment,
courts ought to require the agency to provide a more detailed explana-
tion for that regulation than the court would require of an agency regu-
lating oil or gas or railroads or some entity like that. We argued that if an
agency wants to change its mind and take a little weight from the rail-
road, that's one thing. But, if the agency wants to alter its regulations to
restrict speech, that ought to be something different-something that the
agency has to explain more thoroughly than simply stating, "ta-da."
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Unfortunately, as noted, the Court rejected that argument. I was and am
slightly surprised. I would have thought that the Constitutional Avoid-
ance Doctrine would generally have some weight in this particular
debate, but the Court refused to apply it.
Another interesting aspect of the case involves Justice Kennedy
who, as often happens, was the pivotal vote in this particular case. He
did not join the majority on the core question of when, under the State
Farm formulation, agencies can get away with changing their positions
with minimal explanation and writes what I have found to be an
exceedingly complex analysis of the issue. He says-he doesn't use this
phrasing, obviously-that I know an adequate explanation when I see it,
and I see it here. But I did not see in his complicated, fact specific analy-
sis guidance for agencies in the future as they try to figure out when they
are going to change position and how much explanation will be suffi-
cient. One bright line rule did emerge: An agency at least must
acknowledge that it has changed its position before it can actually do so.
That is not a particularly burdensome requirement for the agency to sat-
isfy. And, frankly, we will have to see what happens in the wake of the
Kennedy concurrence as to how the courts of appeals will deal with it in
its practical implementation. Will they change how they analyze this
question, or will they say that nothing came out of the Fox opinion that
really moves the ball other than, obviously, that the court should have
addressed the First Amendment issue.
That said, you also have to wonder if this problem is affected by the
context in which it arises. That is, will this Court view all changes in
agency position through the same deferential lens? Different justices
may view different shifts in agency positions as more or less warranted
under related regulatory and statutory regimes and in light of different
constitutional provisions. We will have to wait and see if Fox Television
really represents a sea-change in administrative law or is just a curiosity
of its unique setting. I suspect there will be Courts of Appeals that say
this decision did not change the law much, that will go back to the State
Farm formulation, and that will require the agency to spend more time
justifying changes in rules than they have in the past.
I realize I am running toward the end of what I was allotted by way
of time, but my partner and good friend, Newt Minow, who was the
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission and, therefore, a
dutiful regulator in the Kennedy administration, said that there are two
things that you have to do when you give a keynote speech. You have to
start with a funny story and you have to end with a funny story. So, I am
going to end with my favorite funny story, or one of my favorites. It
only connects with the subject matter here because, just as Justice Ste-
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vens wrote Pacifica, he also wrote the major dissent in Fox; and since he
is probably on his last term in the Court, I want to pay a tribute to him.
He was, in my judgment, the best hypothetical questioner on the
Supreme Court throughout the thirty-something years that he has been
there. My absolute, dead-on favorite hypothetical question that the Jus-
tice has ever asked was in a case called NCAA v. Tarkanian. Now, I
suspect that the law students in the audience are going to look at me,
saying, "huh?" Those of you who follow basketball religiously will
know who Tarkanian is, but a lot of people will not; this is generational.
Tarkanian was, without question, the biggest alleged violator of the
NCAA rules in the history of sport. He was the coach at the University
of Nevada, Las Vegas, and ultimately, the NCAA caught up to him and
told UNLV that it had to fire him or cease playing NCAA sanctioned
basketball. UNLV fired him, and not surprisingly, he was not thrilled by
that action, and brought a lawsuit. Now, he loved UNLV and did not
want to sue the University of Nevada; what he wanted to do was to sue
the NCAA. He brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which is the Civil Rights Statute. That statute, of course, requires state
action. And, therefore, the issue in the case was whether or not the
NCAA is a state actor, because of its close interrelationship with UNLV
and other state schools. Our firm was representing the NCAA, and Rex
Lee, actually, was arguing the case on behalf of the Association. But the
hypothetical did not come up during Rex's presentation; it arose when
Tarkanian's lawyer was arguing. This argument occurred back in the
mid '80s, so this was going to be that lawyer's one and only argument, I
think, in the Supreme Court. And he was up there, and Justice Stevens
asked him the following hypothetical: Mr. Jones, what would you say
about this situation. Let's assume that O'Hare Airport-which is a
municipally run airport-went to the manager of United Airlines and
said to them . . . no wait, sorry, the other way around. United Airlines
goes to the O'Hare airport officials and says, "Look, we don't like the
guy who is handling our particular terminal. If you don't fire him, we're
going to take all of our airplanes and go to Midway Airport." In that
situation, would United Airlines be a state actor?
I do not know if you can see me because of the way the lights are in
this room, but I am assuming you can. Tarkanian's lawyer's response
was to stare with an open mouth. I was sitting at council table and, to
me, it seemed that he was there for about a minute like that. I am sure
the time was shorter than that, but he did stand there for quite a while.
And while he was standing there, Justice Scalia leans forward and says,
"The answer you're looking for is 'no."' Tarkanian's lawyer, pretty
sharp at this point, says, "No." Justice Stevens leans forward and asks,
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"Why?" Tarkanian's lawyer looks at Scalia! Justice Scalia says, "You're
on your own, now." And on that, thank you.
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